Gul Plaza fire probe leaves blame unresolved

The commission prepared a report on the conflagration, which the Sindh Home Department has released. had continued to operate as a commercial building despite being hazardous and in violation of fire-safety requirements.

It concludes that responsibility cannot be pinned on a single institution or government, but lies in the collective failure of systems meant to identify risks, enforce safety rules, fight fires and rescue people in emergencies. The commission found that the dangers at the plaza were known well before the tragedy.

Civil Defence inspections in 2024 and 2025 had identified the absence of fire-safety equipment, the presence of inflammable commercial material and deficiencies in exit routes. Yet the identified shortcomings were not rectified and no effective legal action followed.

The report described the failure of Civil Defence as not a failure to know about the danger, but a failure to enforce action against a known danger. The building's management was also held responsible for failing to rectify known defects.

Its regularised plan provided for 1,102 shops, while 1,153 shops were actually operating in the building, with large quantities of inflammable commercial goods stored inside. The commission also questioned the role of the district administration, finding that Gul Plaza was not subjected to a joint audit despite a three-tier fire-audit mechanism established on the directions of the Sindh High Court.

The office of the Deputy Commissioner South was held institutionally responsible for failing to activate the available system of audit and oversight. The Sindh Building Control Authority, too, could not escape responsibility by relying on the position that inspections were conducted only on complaints, the commission said.

The Sindh Building Control Ordinance gave the authority powers to take corrective action against dangerous buildings, while Gul Plaza's incomplete records and ineffective fire-safety oversight also reflected institutional failure. The report found failures at the scene of the fire as well.

There was an "extremely unwise" delay in informing the fire brigade, while the fire brigade itself arrived later than its prescribed response standard. Effective firefighting began only after approximately 35 to 40 minutes. Water shortages and repeated refilling further hampered firefighting and rescue operations.

The commission questioned how effective water supplies were not available during the crucial initial phase despite claims that fire stations had water reserves. It also found that the delayed deployment of critical firefighting equipment reduced the chances of rescuing people who remained accessible inside the building.

The decision to disconnect electricity created another deadly obstacle: darkness inside the building further reduced the chances of people escaping from the upper floors. Although a speaker system was installed in the building, it was not used to issue evacuation instructions or guide those trapped inside.

The commission also highlighted a missed rescue opportunity involving Rescue 1122. Rescuers reached the scene while a meaningful window for intervention still remained.

Rescue was possible between around 11:15pm and 11:20pm, when some victims were still visible, while access through the ramp remained possible until approximately 11:30pm. The commission found that Rescue 1122 failed to turn this remaining opportunity into a large-scale rescue operation.

The report further raised questions over electrical safety, noting that the law required regular inspections of electrical installations and equipment. However, 's statement, no regular electrical inspection had been conducted. Overall, the commission rejected the idea that the tragedy could be attributed to one department, one institution or one government.

It found that the legal powers, audit mechanisms, building-control authorities, firefighting services and emergency-response institutions existed across different periods. But the system as a whole failed to function effectively. The victims did not die from fire alone.

Delays, darkness, blocked exits, obstructive windows, inactive safety systems, ineffective oversight and rescue opportunities that were not used in time all contributed to the loss of life. In a sombre preface to the report, Justice Faisal quoted poet Mustafa Zaidi: "Whose hands should I search for my blood?

The whole city is wearing gloves. "